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Multi-parameter Mechanism Design
and Sequential Posted Pricing
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Abstract
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a prin-
cipal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn
from a known distribution. In single-parameter settings (i.e., where each agent’s preference is given by a single pri-
vate value for being served and zero for not being served) this problem is solved [19]. Unfortunately, these single
parameter optimal mechanisms are impractical and rarely employed [1], and furthermore the underlying economic
theory fails to generalize to the important, relevant, and unsolved multi-dimensional setting (i.e., where each agent’s
preference is given by multiple values for each of the multiple services available) [24].
In contrast to the theory of optimal mechanisms we develop a theory of sequential posted price mechanisms, where
agents in sequence are offered take-it-or-leave-it prices. We prove that these mechanisms are approximately optimal
in single-dimensional settings. These posted-price mechanisms avoid many of the properties of optimal mechanisms
that make the latter impractical. Furthermore, these mechanisms generalize naturally to multi-dimensional settings
where they give the first known approximations to the elusive optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem.
In particular, we solve multi-dimensional multi-unit auction problems and generalizations to matroid feasibility con-
straints. The constant approximations we obtain range from 1.5 to 8. For all but one case, our posted price sequences
can be computed in polynomial time.
This work can be viewed as an extension and improvement of the single-agent algorithmic pricing work of [10]
to the setting of multiple agents where the designer has combinatorial feasibility constraints on which agents can
simultaneously obtain each service.
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1 Introduction
Suppose the local organizers for a prominent symposium on computer science need to arrange for suitable hotel ac-
commodations in the Boston area for the attendees of the conference. There are a number of hotel rooms available
with different features and attendees have preferences over the rooms. The organizers need a mechanism for soliciting
preferences, assigning rooms, and calculating payments. Fortunately, they have distributional knowledge over the par-
ticipants’ preferences (e.g., from similar conferences). This is a stereotypical multi-dimensional setting for mechanism
design that, for instance, also arises in most resource allocation problems in the Internet. What mechanism should the
organizers employ to maximize their objective (e.g., revenue)?
The economic theory of optimal mechanism design is elegant and predictive in single-dimensional settings. Here
Myerson’s theory of virtual valuations and characterizations of incentive constraints via monotonicity guide the design
of optimal truthful mechanisms [19] with practical (often non-truthful) implementations [1]. The challenge of multi-
dimensional settings (e.g., in the likely case that conference attendees, i.e., agents, have different values for different
hotel rooms) is two-fold. First, multi-dimensional settings are unlikely to permit succinct descriptions of optimal
mechanisms [18, 21, 24]. Second, optimal mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings are unlikely to have practical
implementations – even asking agents to report their true types across the many possible outcomes of the mechanism
may be impractical. In summary, theory and practical considerations from optimal mechanism design in single-
dimensional settings fail to generalize to multi-dimensional settings.
This paper approaches these issues through the lens of approximation. Our main results are simple, practical,
approximately optimal mechanisms for a large class of multi-dimensional settings. We consider the multi-dimensional
setting through a single dimensional analogy wherein each multi-dimensional agent is represented by many inde-
pendent single-dimensional agents (e.g., one for each hotel room). The optimal revenue for this single-dimensional
setting is well understood and, due to increased competition among agents, upper-bounds that of the original multi-
dimensional setting. We describe a “sequential posted price” mechanism for the single-dimensional setting that is
practical and approximately optimal and, in contrast to the optimal single-dimensional mechanism, achieves its ap-
proximation without inter-agent competition. This gives a robustness to deviations in modeling assumptions and, for
instance, the same mechanism continues to be approximately optimal in the original multi-dimensional setting. There-
fore, our theory for approximately optimal single-dimensional mechanisms generalizes to multi-dimensional settings.
In the context of computer science literature this work is an extension of algorithmic pricing (e.g., [12]) to settings
with multiple agents; it is unrelated to the standard computational questions of algorithmic mechanism design (e.g.,
[17, 20]). The central problem in algorithmic pricing can be viewed (for the most part) as Bayesian revenue maximiza-
tion in a single agent setting (e.g., [12]). Algorithmic pricing is hard to approximate when the agent’s values for differ-
ent outcomes are generally correlated [8]; however, when the values are independent there is a 3-approximation [10].
In this context, our results improve and extend the independent case to settings with multiple agents and combinatorial
feasibility constraints. Notice that the challenge in these problems is one imposed by the multi-dimensional incen-
tive constraints and not one from an inherent complexity of an underlying non-game-theoretic optimization problem.
(E.g., in the hotel example the underlying optimization problem is simply maximum weighted matching.) In contrast,
most work in algorithmic mechanism design addresses settings where economic incentives are well understood but the
underlying optimization problem is computationally intractable (e.g., combinatorial auctions [17]).
While our exposition focuses on revenue maximization, all of our techniques and results apply equally well to
social welfare. Social welfare is unique among objectives in that designing optimal mechanisms in multi-dimensional
settings is solved (by the VCG mechanism). Therefore, the interesting implication of our work on social welfare
maximization is that sequential posted pricing approximates the welfare of the VCG mechanism and may be more
practical.
Sequential Posted Pricing. Consider a single-parameter setting where each agent has a private value for service and
there is a combinatorial feasibility constraint on the set of agents that can be simultaneously served. For this setting
a sequential posted pricing (SPM) is a mechanism defined by a price for each agent, a sequence on agents, and the
semantics that each agent is offered their corresponding price in sequence as a take-it-or-leave-it while-supplies-last
offer. Meaning: if it is possible to serve the agent given the set of agents already being served then the agent is offered
the price. A rational agent will accept if and only if the price is no more than their private value for service. That prices
are associated with the agents and not the sequence reflects the possibility that agents may play asymmetric roles for
a given feasibility constraint or value distribution.
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Consider the following hotel rooms example with one room, two attendees, and attendee values independently
and identically distributed uniformly between $100 and $200. The optimal mechanism is the Vickrey auction and its
expected revenue is $133. The optimal sequential posted pricing is for the organizers to offer the room to attendee 1
at a price of $150. If the attendee accepts, then the room is sold, otherwise it is offered to attendee 2 for $100. The
expected revenue of this SPM is $125.
We are interested in comparing the optimal mechanism to the optimal posted pricing in general settings. A special
class of SPMs is one where mechanisms have provable performance guarantees for any sequence of the agents. These
order-oblivious posted pricings (OPM) are mechanisms defined by a price for each agent and the semantics that each
agent is offered their corresponding price in some arbitrary sequence as a take-it-or-leave-it while-supplies-last offer.
In single-dimensional settings, the advantages of sequential posted pricings speak to the many reasons optimal
auctions are rarely seen in practice [1], and explain why posted pricings are ubiquitous [14]. First, take-it-or-leave-
it offers result in trivial game dynamics: truthful responding is a dominant strategy. Second, SPMs satisfy strong
notions of collusion resistance, e.g., group strategyproofness (see [11]): the only way in which an agent can “help”
another agent is to decline an offer that he could have accepted, thereby hurting his own utility. Third, agents do
not need to precisely know or report their value, they must only be able to evaluate their offer; therefore, they risk
minimal exposure of their private information. Fourth, agents learn immediately whether they will be served or not. In
conclusion, the robustness of SPMs in single-dimensional settings makes their approximation of optimal mechanisms
independently worthy of study.
The final robustness property of SPMs, which is of paramount importance to our study of the multi-dimensional
setting, is that they minimize the role of agent competition which implies that single-dimensional SPMs can be used
“as-is” in multi-dimensional settings with only a constant factor loss in performance. In our translation from the multi-
dimensional setting to the single-dimensional setting, each multi-dimensional agent has many single-dimensional
representatives. A good OPM for the single-dimensional setting can be viewed as an OPM for the multi-dimensional
setting by grouping all representatives of an agent together and making their offers simultaneously to the agent. The
agent will of course accept the offer that maximizes their utility. The resulting mechanism is truthful and achieves
the same performance guarantee as the single-parameter OPM. For SPMs where we are not free to group each multi-
dimensional agent’s single-dimensional representative together, an agent possibly faces a strategic dilemma of whether
to accept an offer (e.g., for one hotel room) early on or wait for a later offer (e.g., another hotel room) which may or
may not still be available. Our guarantee is that regardless of the actions of any agent with such a strategic option
(i.e., implementation in undominated strategies, see, e.g., [4]) our performance is a constant fraction of the original
SPM’s performance. Given the advantages of SPMs over truthful mechanisms, such a non-truthful SPM may be more
practically relevant than a truthful implementation.
Finally, we note that most of our results for posted pricings are constructive and give efficient algorithms for them.
A posted price mechanism has two components where computation is necessary: an offline computation of the prices
to post (and for SPMs, the sequence of agents) and an online while-supplies-last offering of said prices.1 The agents
are only present for the online part where the mechanism is trivial. All of the computational burden for an SPM is
in the offline part. The offline computation of our posted price mechanisms is based on a subroutine that repeatedly
samples the distribution of agent values and simulates Myerson’s mechanism on the sample. This clearly requires
more computation than just running Myerson’s mechanism on the real agents in the first place; however, we benefit
from the robustness that comes from the trivial online implementation of posted pricings.
Related work. See [24] and references therein for work in economics on optimal multi-dimensional mechanism
design. See [10] and references therein for work in computer science on multi-dimensional pricing for a single agent.
We extend the setting from [10] to multiple agents and improve their approximation for a single agent from 3 to 2.
Sequential posted price mechanisms have been considered previously in single-dimensional settings. Sandholm
and Gilpin [23] show experimentally that these mechanisms compare favorably to Myerson’s optimal mechanisms.
Blumrosen and Holenstein [7] show how to compute the optimal posted prices in the special case where agents’ values
are distributed identically, and also show that in this case the revenue of these mechanisms approaches the optimal
revenue asymptotically. Several papers study revenue maximization through online posted pricings in the context of
adversarial values, albeit in the simpler context of multi-unit auctions [6, 15, 5].
1This is similar, for example, to nearest neighbor algorithms, where one distinguishes the time taken to construct a database, and the time taken
to compute nearest neighbors over that database given a query.
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Feasibility constraint Type of mechanism Gap from optimal Reference
upper bound lower bound
General matroid SPM 2
√
pi/2 ≈ 1.25 (§ 4.1, § C.1, [7])
OPM O(log k) 2 (§ 5.1, § D.2)
VCG 2 - (§ I)
k-uniform matroid, partition matroid SPM e/(e− 1) ≈ 1.58 1.25 (§ 4.2, § C.2)OPM 2 2 (§ 5.2, § D.2)
Graphical matroid OPM 3 2 (§ 5.2, § D.3)
Intersection of two matroids SPM 3 1.25 (§ 4.2, § C.3)
Intersection of two partition matroids OPM 6.75 2 (§ 5.3, § D.4)
Non-matroid downward closed SPM, OPM - Ω(log n/ log log n) (§ C.5)
Table 1: A summary of our results for single-dimensional preferences. Here n is the number of agents, and k is the
size of the largest feasible set.
Feasibility constraint Solution concept Mechanism Gap from optimal
multi-unit multi-item with unit-demand dominant strategy truthful OPM 6.75
Graphical matroid with unit-demand dominant strategy truthful OPM 32/3
General matroid intersection alg. imp. in undominated strategies SPM 8
Combinatorial auction with small bundles alg. imp. in undominated strategies SPM 8
Table 2: A summary of our results for multi-dimensional preferences (§ 6).
The question of whether simple mechanisms can achieve near-optimal revenue was considered recently by Hartline
and Roughgarden [13]. Except for their result on single-item auctions with anonymous reserve prices, their VCG based
mechanisms are likely to suffer the same impracticality criticisms as the optimal mechanism. The essay “The Lovely
but Lonely Vickrey Auction” by Ausubel and Milgrom [1] discusses why this is the case. As a consequence of the
near-optimality of sequential posted prices, we answer one of their open questions in the positive, namely, that the gap
between the revenue optimal mechanism and a VCG mechanism with appropriate reserve prices is a constant (i.e., 2)
in matroid settings but with arbitrary valuation distributions. This bound matches their result for regular distributions.
Our setting of sequential posted pricing with a matroid constraint is very closely related to the so-called matroid
secretary problem [2, 3, 16], but there are two important differences: (a) they assume that agents’ values are adversarial,
whereas in our setting they are drawn from known distributions, and (b) in their setting agents arrive in random order,
whereas we consider optimized and adversarial orderings. Some of our results are reminiscent of that work, but our
techniques are necessarily different.
Finally, our results for OPMs in the multi-unit auction setting are based on work on prophet inequalities from
optimal stopping theory. While that work applies directly to the analysis of OPMs in the single-item auction setting,
we show that it extends to k-unit auctions with no loss in approximation factor.
Our results. Our results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Our approximation factors in both the single-dimensional
and multi-dimensional settings depend on the kind of feasibility constraint that the seller faces. In the single-dimensional
setting, the feasibility constraint is a set system over agents specifying the sets of agents that can be simultaneously
served. In the multi-dimensional setting, each agent is interested in buying one of multiple kinds of items or services
and we assume that agents’ values for the different services are independent. The feasibility constraint is a set system
over (agent, service) pairs. In both cases we assume that the set system is downward closed, i. e., any subset of a
feasible set is also feasible. All of the mechanisms we develop can be computed efficiently, except for the O(log k)
approximate OPM in general matroid settings.
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2 Problem set-up and preliminaries
2.1 Bayesian optimal mechanism design
In the single-parameter setting, the mechanism design problem we study (hereafter abbreviated BSMD for Bayesian
single-parameter mechanism design) is stated as follows. There are n single-parameter agents and a single seller
providing a certain service. Agent i’s value vi for getting served is distributed independently according to distribution
function Fi with density fi. The seller faces a feasibility constraint specified by a set system J ⊆ 2[n], and is allowed
to serve any set of agents in J . We assume that the set system J is downward closed. That is, for any A ⊂ B ⊆ 2[n],
B ∈ J implies A ∈ J . A mechanism M for this problem is a function that maps a vector of values v to an allocation
M(v) ∈ J and a pricing π(v) with a price πi to be paid by agent i.
In the Bayesian multi-parameter unit-demand setting (BMUMD for short), we again have n buyers and one seller.
The seller offers a number of different services indexed by set J . The set J is partitioned into groups Ji, with the
services in Ji being targeted at agent i.2 Each agent i is interested in getting any one of the services in Ji (that is,
consumers are unit-demand agents). In the hotel rooms example, the set Ji would contain all the rooms that agent i
may be interested in and the feasibility constraint ensures that each room is allocated to at most one agent. Another
setting with a more general feasibility constraint arises in the context of airline ticket sales: we have a directed graph
with capacities on edges owned by a seller, and a number of agents. Each agent is interested in a path of at most two
hops from some source to some destination in the graph (agents want to buy airline tickets for an itinerary with at most
two legs), and Ji contains all such paths. The feasibility constraint ensures that each leg is allocated upto its capacity
and no more.
Agent i has value vj for service j ∈ Ji. vj is independent of all other values and is drawn from distribution Fj .
Once again the seller faces a feasibility constraint specified by a set system J ⊆ 2J . Note that for every S ∈ J and
i ∈ [n], |S ∩ Ji| ≤ 1, that is each agent gets at most one service. As in the single-parameter case, a mechanism for
this problem maps any set of bids v to an allocation M(v) ∈ J and a pricing π(v).
2.2 Posted-price mechanisms
A sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM), S , is defined by an ordering σ over agents and a collection of prices pi
for i ∈ [n]. The mechanism is run as follows:
1. Initialize A← ∅.
2. For i = 1 through n, do:
(a) If A ∪ {σ(i)} ∈ J , offer to serve agent σ(i) at price pi.
(b) If the agent accepts, A← A ∪ {σ(i)}.
3. Serve the agents in A.
Let ci denote the probability taken over values of agents σ(1), · · · , σ(i − 1) that the mechanism offers to serve
agent i, and let qi = 1− Fi(pi). Then the expected revenue of the sequential mechanism,Rσp, is given by
∑
i ciqipi.
Order-oblivious posted prices. As mentioned earlier, we also study posted-price mechanisms where the order of
offers is picked adversarially. We estimate (pessimistically) the expected revenue of this mechanism as follows:
Roblp = Ev∼F min
S∈Sv
∑
i∈S
pi
Here the minimization is over the class Sv of sets S that are maximal feasible subsets of agents that “desire” service
given values v and prices p: (1) Sv ⊆ J , (2) vi ≥ pi for all i ∈ S, S ∈ Sv, and, (3) for every feasible superset S′ of a
set S ∈ Sv , S′ contains some agent i with vi < pi.
For some instances, we allow a strengthening of OPMs to posted-price mechanisms where the seller is allowed to
deny service to an agent even when the agent can be feasibly served alongside previously served agents. Formally,
2Since we allow for an arbitrary feasibility constraint over the set J , the assumption that the sets Ji are disjoint is without loss of generality.
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the mechanism selects a pricing p, and a set system J ′ ⊆ J , and runs the OPM using the prices p but determining
feasibility according to J ′ instead of J . Crucially, the system J ′ is determined based only on the distributions of
agents’ values and not the values themselves. Therefore, this more general mechanism (that we call an OPM with a
restricted feasibility constraint) retains all of the good properties of OPMs.
OPMs in multi-dimensional settings are similar: agents are approached in turn (in an arbitrary order); each agent
i gets a price-menu over the subset of services in Ji that can be feasibly allocated to the agent. However, we define
SPMs differently: agents are approached in turn (according to an optimal ordering) and offered individual items at
a time. Offers to a single agent are not necessarily contiguous. These mechanisms are not truthful, but we show in
Section 6.2 that they can nonetheless be useful in approximating the BMUMD.
2.3 Myerson’s optimal mechanism
Myerson’s seminal work describes the revenue maximizing mechanism for the Bayesian single-parameter mechanism
design problem. When the value distributions Fi are regular, in Myerson’s mechanism the seller first computes so-
called virtual values for each agent, and then allocates to a feasible subset of agents that maximizes the “virtual
surplus”—the sum of the virtual values of agents in the set minus the cost of serving that set of agents. We define these
quantities formally in Appendix A. For our analyses, we mainly require the following two characterizations of the
expected revenue of any truthful mechanism when the value distributions are regular. Similar characterizations hold
in the non-regular case. These and their extensions to the non-regular case are proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 When all input distributions Fi are regular, the expected revenue of any truthful single-parameter
mechanism M is equal to its expected virtual surplus.
Lemma 2 If Fi is regular for each i, for any truthful mechanism M over the n agents, the revenue of M is bounded
from above by ∑i pMi qMi where qMi is the probability (over v1, · · · , vn) with which M allocates to agent i and
pMi = Fi
−1(1 − qMi ).
Furthermore for every i (with a regular or non-regular value distribution), there exist two prices pi and pi with
corresponding probabilities qi and qi, and a number xi ≤ 1, such that xiqi + (1 − xi)qi = qMi , and the expected
revenue of M is no more than∑i xipiqi + (1− xi)piqi.
3 A reduction from multi-parameter MD to single-parameter MD
We now present a general reduction from the multi-parameter optimal mechanism design problem to the single-
parameter setting. Understanding the properties of optimal mechanisms in multi-parameter settings is tricky. Our
approach begins with an upper bound on the optimal revenue in terms of the optimal revenue for a related single-
parameter problem following an approach of [10]. We describe this first.
An upper bound via copies. Consider an instance I of the BMUMD with n agents, a set J of available services
(with group Ji of services targeted at agent i), and a feasibility constraint J . We will define a new instance of the
BSMD in the following manner. We split each agent in I into |Ji| distinct agents (called “copies”). Each copy is
interested in a single item j ∈ Ji and behaves independently of (and potentially to the detriment of) other copies. We
call this instance Icopies. Formally, the instance has |J | distinct agents interested in a single service; agent j’s value for
getting served, vj , is distributed independently according to Fj . The mechanism again faces a feasibility constraint
given by the set system J .
Icopies is similar to I except that it involves more competition (among different copies of the same multi-parameter
agent). Therefore it is natural to expect that a seller can obtain more revenue in the instance Icopies than in I. The
following lemma formalizes this (see Appendix B for a proof).
Lemma 3 Let A be any individually rational and truthful deterministic mechanism for instance I of the BMUMD.
Then the expected revenue of A, RA, is no more than the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for the single-
parameter instance with copies, Icopies.
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A reduction to single-dimensional OPMs. Next we show that if we can construct a good OPM for the setting with
copies, we can construct a good OPM for the multi-dimensional setting as well. (Again, see Appendix B for a proof).
Theorem 4 Given an instance I of the BMUMD specified by the set system (J,J ), there exists a truthful posted
price mechanism for I which achieves an α-approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal deterministic
truthful mechanism, whenever there exists an OPM for the corresponding BSMD instance Icopies that achieves an
α-approximation to the optimal revenue for Icopies.
4 Sequential posted-price mechanisms
In this section we focus on the BSMD and present approximations to optimal revenue via sequential posted price
mechanisms for several kinds of feasibility constraints, most notably matroids and matroid intersections. Our expo-
sition focuses on describing and analysing the approximately-optimal SPMs, and we defer a discussion of efficiently
computing the SPMs to Appendix F. While our focus is on revenue, our techniques extend to a large class of ob-
jective functions, namely those that are linear in the valuations of the served agents and the payment received by the
mechanism (see Appendix H).
While our analysis of the approximation factor depends closely on the feasibility constraint, we use the same
approach for constructing the SPM in each case. We describe this next.
Suppose first that all the distributions Fi are regular and do not contain any point masses. Let qi = qMi denote
the probability that Myerson’s mechanism serves agent i, and let pi = Fi−1(1 − qi) for all i. The SPM sets a price
of pi for agent i and offers to serve the agents in decreasing order of their prices. If offered service, agent i accepts
with probability exactly qi. If the distribution Fi contains point masses, we modify the mechanism so that agent i is
offered the price pi with probability qi/(1− Fi(pi)), and again has a probability exactly qi of accepting the offer. We
denote this mechanism by S . We note that by Lemma 2, the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism is at most ∑i piqi,
and we will compare the revenue of S to this upper bound. Finally, let the rank of a subset S of agents, rank(S),
denote the size of the largest feasible subset in S, that is, rank(S) = maxS′⊂S,S′∈J |S′|. Then, by definition,∑
i∈S qi ≤
∑
i∈S q
M
i ≤ rank(S).
When the distributions are not regular, we pick prices p randomly as suggested by Lemma 2. In Appendix E we
sketch the modifications required to the analysis to obtain the same approximation factors for this case as in the regular
case. We now present analyses for the expected revenue of S when all the distributions are regular.
4.1 A 2 approximation for matroids
We first consider the setting where the set system ([n],J ) is a matroid. Precisely, it satisfies the following conditions:
1. (heredity) For every A ∈ J , B ⊂ A implies B ∈ J .
2. (augmentation) For every A,B ∈ J with |A| > |B|, there exists e ∈ A \B such that B ∪ {e} ∈ J .
Sets in J are called independent, and maximal independent sets are called bases. A simple consequence of the above
properties is that all bases are equal in size. Therefore, the rank of a set S ⊆ [n], is equal to the size of any maximal
independent subset of S. The span of a set S ⊆ [n], span(S), is the maximal set T ⊇ S with rank(T ) = rank(S).
We now show that for matroid set systems the SPM described above approximates the expected revenue of the
optimal mechanism within a factor of 2.
Theorem 5 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a matroid feasibility constraint. Then, the mechanism S described
above 2-approximates the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for I.
Proof: We show that the mechanism S obtains an expected revenue of at least 12
∑
i piqi. Note that if the mechanism
ignored the feasibility constraint, and offered the prices p to all agents, serving any agent that accepted its offered
price, then its expected revenue would be exactly
∑
i piqi. So our proof accounts for the total revenue lost due to
agents “blocked” from getting an offer by previously served agents.
Formally, let S = {i1 < i2 < · · · < iℓ} be the set of agents served, and let Sj denote the first j elements of S.
Define the sets Bj = span(Sj) \ span(Sj−1). Note that the sets Bj partition the set of blocked agents. Moreover,
Bj ⊆ {i : i ≥ ij}, since we condition on serving S, and so, pi ≤ pij for all i ∈ Bj .
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Denote the price offered to agent ij by pj . Then, the expected revenue lost given that S is served is
∑
1≤j≤ℓ
∑
i∈Bj
piqi ≤ p1
 ∑
i∈span(S1)
qi
+ ∑
1<j≤ℓ
pj
 ∑
i∈span(Sj)
qi −
∑
i∈span(Sj−1)
qi

=
∑
1≤j<ℓ
(pj − pj+1) ∑
i∈span(Sj)
qi
+ pℓ
 ∑
i∈span(Sℓ)
qi

≤
∑
1≤j<ℓ
(pj − pj+1) · j + pℓ · ℓ =
∑
1≤j<ℓ
pj ,
which is the revenue obtained by serving S. Here we used
∑
i∈span(Sj)
qi ≤ rank(Sj) ≤ |Sj | = j. Therefore,
E[revenue lost] ≤
∑
S
∑
j∈S
pj · Pr[S is served] = Rσp,
and so it follows that
∑
i piqi ≤ 2Rσp.
Blumrosen et al. [7] show that the gap between the optimal SPM and Myerson’s mechanism can be as large as√
π/2 ≈ 1.253 even in the single item auction case with i. i. d. agents. We describe this gap example in Appendix C.1.
4.2 Constant factor approximations for other feasibility constraints
We now present improved approximations for special matroids, as well as constant factor approximations for special
non-matroid feasibility constraints. The theorems below are proved in Appendix C.
Uniform matroids and partition matroids. A matroid is k-uniform if all subsets of size at most k are feasible. An
example of a k-uniform matroid constraint is a multi-unit auction where the seller has k units of an item on sale. We
show that we can obtain an improved e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 approximation in this case. We show in Appendix C.2 that
this analysis is tight. This result extends also to partition matroids, i.e. disjoint unions of uniform matroids.
Theorem 6 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a partition-matroid feasibility constraint. Then, the mechanism S
described above e/(e− 1)-approximates the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for I.
Matroid intersections. An intersection of m matroids, M1, · · · ,Mm, is a set system where a set is feasible if and
only if it is feasible in each of the m matroids. An example of an intersection of two matroids is a matching. We show
that the mechanism described above is an m+ 1 approximation for intersections of m matroids.
Theorem 7 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a feasibility constraints that is an intersection of m matroids.
Then, the mechanism S described above (m+ 1)-approximates the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for I.
Combinatorial auctions with small bundles. Consider a situation where the seller has multiple copies of a number
of items on sale, and each agent is interested in some (commonly known) bundles over items (and has a common
value for all of these bundles). When each desired bundle is of size at most m, we call this setting a single-parameter
combinatorial auction with known bundles of size m. In this case the SPM described above achieves an m + 1
approximation.
Theorem 8 Let I be an instance of a single-parameter combinatorial auction with known bundles of size m. Then,
the mechanism S described above (m+ 1)-approximates the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for I.
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The general non-matroid case. We show in Appendix C.5 that the approximations described above cannot extend
to general non-matroid set systems. In particular, the example we construct describes a family of instances with
i. i. d. agents and a symmetric non-matroid constraint for which the ratio between the expected revenue of Myerson’s
mechanism and that of the optimal SPM is Ω(logn/ log logn) where n is the number of agents. The same example
also shows that while in many single-parameter pricing problems when the values are distributed in the range [1, h] it
is possible to obtain an O(log h) approximation to social welfare, the same does not hold in our general setting, and
the gap can be Ω(h). On the other hand, the gap is always bounded by O(h) and is achieved by an SPM that charges
each agent a uniform price of 1.
5 Order-oblivious posted-prices
The approximations designed in Section 4 rely heavily on a specific ordering of the agents. A natural question is
whether the seller can obtain good revenue when he has no control over the ordering. In such a case the seller picks
a set of prices in advance, and then offers them to the agents on a first-come first-served basis. We show that in many
setting it is possible to determine a set of prices for which such “order-oblivious” mechanisms (OPMs) perform well.
As described in Section 2, an OPM specifies the prices to charge every agent, as well as a feasibility constraint
(potentially different from J ) to determine whether or not to make an offer to an agent. To pick the prices, we
follow the approach taken in Section 4. The prices in the OPM are either set to be the same as for the corresponding
approximately-optimal SPM, or set to infinity (effectively dropping the respective agent from consideration). We now
present the details for different kinds of feasibility constraints.
5.1 An O(log k) approximation for general matroids
For general matroids we give an O(log k) bound on the gap below, where k is the rank of the matroid. We remark that
a similar result was obtained by Babaioff et al. [2] for the related matroid secretary problem. However, we show in
Appendix D.1 that their approach cannot give a non-trivial approximation in our setting.
Theorem 9 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a matroid feasibility constraint. Then, there exists a set of prices
p such that Roblp O(log k)-approximatesRM for I.
Proof: We present the proof for regular distributions. Appendix E presents the extension to the non-regular case. Note
that since the feasibility constraint is a matroid, for any instantiation of values, the worst (least revenue) allocation is
achieved when agents arrive in the order of increasing prices. Hereafter we assume that agents always arrive in that
order. Let ci be as defined in Section 2.2; recall that the expected revenue may be expressed as
∑
i cipiqi.
Now consider a hypothetical situation where the prices are all equal to 1 but the probabilities with which the agents
accept the offered prices are still qi. Then, the expected revenue of this hypothetical mechanism would be given by∑
i ciqi which is at least 1/2
∑
i qi by the argument in Theorem 5. In other words, the weighted average of the cis is
at least 1/2, weighted by the qis. We get the following sequence of implications.
(1/2)
∑
i
qi ≤
∑
i
ciqi ≤
∑
i:ci<1/4
qi/4 +
∑
i:ci≥1/4
qi = (1/4)
∑
i
qi + (3/4)
∑
i:ci≥1/4
qi ⇒
∑
i:ci≥1/4
qi ≥ (1/3)
∑
i
qi
This means that the probability mass of elements having ci ≥ 1/4 is at least a third of the total. LetG = {i|ci ≥ 1/4};
the revenue obtained from serving only the agents in G is∑
i∈G
cipiqi ≥ 1/4
∑
i∈G
pMi q
M
i . (1)
Consider recursively applying the above argument to the elements outside G. At step j, let Gj be the newly found
G, and let Ej be the set of agents still under consideration, defined as E1 = [n] and Ej = Ej−1 − Gj−1 for j > 1.
Now, at each stage, Gj contains at least one third of the total probability mass of the remaining elements; thus, at stage
ℓ = ⌈1+ log3/2 k⌉, we would have reduced the total probability mass to less than 3/4; by noting that any singleton set
is independent in a matroid and applying Markov’s inequality we may see that Gℓ = Eℓ. Since the collection of Gj ’s
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form a size O(log k) partition of [n], and summing (1) over the collection gives a total expected revenue of RM/4,
we may conclude that there is some Gj which gives a Ω(1/ log k)-fraction of RM regardless of ordering.
We remark that while the 2-approximate SPM in Section 4 can be computed efficiently, we do not know of an
efficient algorithm for computing an O(log k)-approximate order-oblivious pricing.
5.2 Improved approximations for special matroids
We first note that for the case of uniform matroids (where every set of size at most k is independent), an approximation
of 3 can be obtained by employing techniques developed by Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg [10] for pricing problems
in multi-parameter settings. We can further improve this approximation factor to 2 via techniques developed by
Samuel-Cahn [22] in the context of prophet inequalities in optimal stopping theory. We describe this approach in
Appendix D.2 and show that this approximation factor is tight.
Theorem 10 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a uniform matroid feasibility constraint. Then, there exists a set
of prices p such that Roblp 2-approximatesRM for I.
Corollary 11 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a partition matroid feasibility constraint. Then, there exists a
set of prices p such that Roblp 2-approximatesRM for I.
For graphical matroids, Babaioff et al. [3] and Korula and Pa´l [16] develop approaches for reducing this case to a
partition matroid that in our setting yield a 4-approximation to the optimal revenue; in Appendix D.3 we use a similar
approach but exploit the connection between prophet inequalities and partition matroids to obtain a 3-approximation.
Theorem 12 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a graphical matroid feasibility constraint. Then, there exists an
OPM with a restricted feasibility constraint that is a partition matroid, that 3-approximatesRM for I.
5.3 OPMs for matroid intersections
As for SPMs, our techniques for approximately-optimal OPMs in matroid settings extend to intersections of few
matroids. For intersections of two partition matroids we get an 6.75-approximation (see theorem below, and proof in
Appendix D.4). For intersections of m arbitrary matroids, our techniques imply an O(m log k) approximation where
k is the maximum size of a feasible set (and so is bounded by the least matroid rank); we omit the proof for brevity.
Theorem 13 Let I be an instance of the BSMD with a feasibility constraint given by the intersection of two partition
matroids. Then, there exists a set of prices p such that Roblp 6.75-approximatesRM for I.
The non-matroid case. Example 1 in Appendix C.5 already implies that order-oblivious pricings cannot obtain
more than an O(log n/ log logn) fraction of the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism in general in non-matroid settings.
How do they compare to the optimal SPM? We show in Appendix D.5 that the gap between the optimal order-oblivious
pricing and the optimal SPM can be large — Ω(log n/ log logn) — in the non-matroid setting.
6 Approximations for the multi-parameter setting
We now present approximations for various versions of the BMUMD.
6.1 Approximation through truthful mechanisms
We first note that for the hotel rooms example discussed in the introduction, and indeed for any setting with unit-
demand agents and multiple units of multiple items on sale, a 6.75-approximation follows from Theorems 4 and 13.
Theorem 14 Consider an instance of the BMUMD where the seller has multiple copies of n items on sale, and agents
are unit-demand and have independently distributed values for each item. Then there exists an 6.75-approximate OPM
for this instance. The prices for this mechanism can be computed in polynomial time.
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A similar result for graphical matroids follows from Theorems 4 , 12 and 13 (see Appendix G for a proof).
Theorem 15 Consider an instance of the BMUMD based on a graph G = (V,E) where the agents have independent
values for different edges and are interested in buying one edge each. The seller can allocate any forest in the graph.
Then there exists a 10.67 approximate OPM for this instance. The prices for this mechanism can be computed in
polynomial time.
6.2 Approximation through implementation in undominated strategies
Both of the results above involve feasibility constraints that admit good OPMs in single-dimensional settings. Can we
design good multi-dimensional mechanisms for set systems that admit good SPMs in the single-dimensional setting,
but for which we do not know constant approximate OPMs? Two examples are general matroid intersections and
combinatorial auctions with small bundles (e.g. the airline tickets setting described in Section 2).
We now show that this can be done if we relax truthfulness to implementation in undominated strategies. (See
formal definition in Appendix G.) Our mechanism for both of the cases above is an SPM specified by a set of prices,
one for each service in J , and an ordering over services. It begins by announcing the prices to the agents. Then,
as for single-dimensional instances, it considers offering the services to the agents in turn: at every step, depending
on the services allocated so far, it determines whether or not it is feasible to allocate the next service j ∈ Ji to the
corresponding agent i, and if so, offers a price pj to i. This mechanism is not truthful. For example, an agent may
reject an offer for a service j even if his value for j exceeds its price, if he anticipates obtaining a more profitable offer
in the future. Nevertheless we can infer some properties about rational agent behavior in such a mechanism.
Lemma 16 Consider an instance I of the BMUMD and an SPM as defined above with prices p and ordering σ. Then,
the following holds for any undominated strategy of any agent: if an agent i desires only one service at prices p, that
is, vj ≥ pj for only one j ∈ Ji, then the agent must accept j if offered the service.
This lemma and the following theorem are proved in Appendix G.
Theorem 17 Given an instance of the BMUMD with a general matroid intersection constraint, there exists an SPM
that implements a 8-approximation in undominated strategies. Given an instance of a combinatorial auction with
known bundles of size 2, there exists an SPM that implements a 8-approximation for the instance in undominated
strategies.
7 Discussion
We presented constant factor approximations to revenue for several classes of multi-dimensional mechanism design
problems by designing approximately-optimal posted price mechanisms for single-dimensional settings. This ap-
proach does not extend beyond matroid and matroid-like settings. However, it is possible that there is some other
class of simple near-optimal mechanisms for non-matroid single-dimensional settings that do not exploit competition
among agents. Such mechanisms may lead to approximately-optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms for a broader
class of feasibility constraints.
More generally, two important assumptions underlie our work: (1) agents are unit-demand, and (2) their values
for different services are distributed independently. In the absence of either of these assumptions the upper bound on
the optimal revenue based on the setting with copies does not remain valid. An important open question is to design a
reasonably tight upper bound in those cases, and use it to approximate the optimal mechanism.
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A Myerson’s mechanism and revenue bounds for truthful mechanisms
Myerson’s seminal work describes the revenue maximizing mechanism for the Bayesian single-parameter mechanism
design problem, BSMD, described in Section 2.1. In Myerson’s mechanism the seller first computes so-called virtual
values for each agent, and then allocates to a feasible subset of agents that maximizes the “virtual surplus”—the sum
of the virtual values of agents in the set minus the cost of serving that set of agents. These quantities are formally
defined as follows.
Definition 1 For a valuation vi drawn from Fi, the virtual valuation of agent i is given by
φi(vi) = vi − 1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
The virtual surplus of a set S of agents is defined as Φ(S,v) =∑i∈S φi(vi).
Myerson’s optimal mechanism is based on the following observation.
Proposition 1 The expected revenue of any truthful single-parameter mechanism M is equal to its expected virtual
surplus.
A direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that the expected revenue maximizing mechanism would be one that max-
imizes expected virtual surplus. Given a vector v of values, Myerson’s mechanism serves the set argmaxS Φ(S,v).
This mechanism is truthful when the virtual valuation function is monotone non-decreasing for every i, or in other
words, the distribution Fi is regular. Note that we do not explicitly specify the prices charged by the mechanism.
These are uniquely determined by the allocation rule assuming that agents that are not served pay nothing.
Definition 2 A one dimensional distribution distribution F is regular, if φ(v) is monotone non-decreasing in v.
Irregular distributions and ironed virtual values. When the distributionsFi are irregular, that is, Definition 2 does
not hold, Myerson’s mechanism as described above will no longer be truthful. Myerson fixed this case by “ironing”
the virtual valuation function and converting it into a monotone non-decreasing function. We skip the description of
this procedure; the reader is referred to [9, 10] for details. Let us denote the ironed virtual value of an agent with value
vi by φ¯i(vi). We then note the following.
Proposition 18 The expected revenue of any truthful single-parameter mechanism M is no more than its expected
ironed virtual surplus. If the probability with which the mechanism serves agent i, as a function of vi, is constant over
any valuation range in which the ironed virtual value of i is constant, the expected revenue is equal to expected ironed
virtual surplus.
Myerson’s mechanism serves a subset of agents that maximizes the ironed virtual surplus, breaking ties in an
arbitrary but consistent manner. Denoting the revenue of a mechanism A by RA and the revenue of Myerson’s
mechanism M by RM we get the following:
Theorem 19 RM ≥ RA for every truthful mechanismA.
12
Bounding the revenue of the Bayesian optimal mechanism. Propositions 1 and 18 give one approach of bounding
the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism. We now develop a different bound that is useful in proving perfor-
mance guarantees for posted-price mechanisms.
Lemma 2 If Fi is regular for each i, for any truthful mechanism M over the n agents, the revenue of M is bounded
from above by ∑i pMi qMi where qMi is the probability (over v1, · · · , vn) with which M allocates to agent i and
pMi = Fi
−1(1 − qMi ).
Furthermore for every i (with a regular or non-regular value distribution), there exist two prices pi and pi with
corresponding probabilities qi and qi, and a number xi ≤ 1, such that xiqi + (1 − xi)qi = qMi , and the expected
revenue of M is no more than∑i xipiqi + (1− xi)piqi.
Proof: We prove the regular case first. Consider the revenue that M draws from serving agent i. This is clearly
bounded above by the optimal mechanism that sells to only i, but with probability at most qMi . By Proposition 1, such
a mechanism should sell to agent i with probability 1 whenever the value of the agent is above Fi−1(1− qMi ) and with
probability 0 otherwise. The revenue of the optimal such mechanism is therefore pMi qMi .
In the non-regular case, note that the value pMi may fall in a valuation range that has constant ironed virtual value.
Let pi denote the infimum inf{v : φ¯i(v) = φ¯i(pMi )} of this range and pi denote the supremum sup{v : φ¯i(v) =
φ¯i(p
M
i )}. Let qi = 1 − Fi(pi) and qi = 1 − Fi(pi). Then, qi ≤ qMi ≤ qi, and there exists an xi such that
xiqi + (1 − xi)qi = qMi . Now an easy consequence of Proposition 18 is that the optimal mechanism with selling
probability qMi sells to the agent with probability xi if the agent’s value is between pi and pi, and with probability 1 if
the value is above pi. The revenue of this mechanism is exactly xiqipi + (1− xi)qipi.
B Reducing BMUMD to BSMD
In this section we prove Lemma 3 and Theorem 4.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first note that a mechanism is individually rational if we have πi ≤ vj for j ∈ S ∩ Ji, and
πi = 0 if S ∩ Ji = ∅. Truthful mechanisms in multi-parameter settings satisfy the weak monotonicity condition
defined below.
Definition 3 A mechanism (M,π) satisfies weak monotonicity if for any agent i and any two types (value vectors) v1
and v2 with v1j = v2j for all j ∈ J \ Ji, the following holds:
v1Mi(v1) + v
2
Mi(v2)
≥ v1Mi(v2) + v2Mi(v1)
Here Mi(v) denotes the unique index in M(v) ∩ Ji.
We show that we can construct a truthful mechanismAcopies for the Icopies with revenue no less than that ofA. The
lemma then follows from the optimality of Myerson’s mechanism. Given a vector of values v, the mechanism Acopies
allocates to the set thatA allocates to in I given the same value vector. We first claim that the allocation rule ofAcopies
is monotone non-decreasing in any vj , implying that there exists a payment rule that makes the mechanism truthful.
To prove the claim, fix any agent i and j ∈ Ji, and consider two value vectors v1 and v2 with v1j = x, v2j = y, and
v1j′ = v
2
j′ for j′ 6= j. Let αx and αy denote the probabilities of serving agent i with service j under the two value
vectors respectively, and let βx and βy denote the total value that agent i obtains from other services j′ ∈ Ji, j′ 6= j,
in the two cases respectively. Then the weak-monotonicity (Definition 3) of A implies that
(xαx + βx) + (yαy + βy) ≥ (xαy + βy) + (yαx + βx)
or,
(x − y)(αx − αy) ≥ 0
Therefore the claim holds.
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It remains to prove that the expected revenue ofAcopies given Icopies is no less than the expected revenue ofA given
I. Note that any deterministic multi-parameter mechanism can be interpreted as offering a price menu with one price
for each item or service to each agent as a function of other agents’ bids [25]. The agent then chooses the item or
service that brings her the most utility. Given this characterization, suppose that for a fixed set v of values, mechanism
A offers a price menu with prices p to agent i. Then, it draws a revenue of pj from i whenever service j is offered.
On the other hand, mechanism Acopies charges the agent j the minimum amount it needs to bid to be served, which is
no less than pj , as A is individually rational.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider an α-approximate OPM for Icopies with prices p. The α-approximate mechanism for
I is described as follows. It serves the agents in the order in which they arrive. When agent i arrives, depending on
the set of services already allocated, the mechanism determines the subset J ′i of services in Ji that can be feasibly
allocated to i, and offers a price menu of {pj}j∈J′
i
to i. Agent i then chooses a service from the menu and this service
is allocated to it. Truthfulness follows from the definition. In order to argue that the mechanism is α-approximate, we
will show that its revenue is no less than the revenue of the OPM for I—Roblp . Then the result follows from Lemma 3.
To see that the expected revenue of the mechanism is at least Roblp , we claim that the mechanism allocates a maximal
feasible set of services. If not, then there exists an agent i and a service j such that it is feasible to allocate j to i (that
is, j ∈ J ′i , and i has not be allocated any service), and the value of i for j exceeds its price. Then, at the time that
i is offered a price menu, it must have been the case that i chose j or some other service in J ′i and got allocated that
service, and we get a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
C Approximations via SPMs
In this section we present missing proofs from Section 4. In particular, we prove that the SPMs described in Section 4
are e/(e− 1) approximate for partition matroids, m approximate for intersections of m matroids, and m approximate
for combinatorial auctions with known bundles of size m.
C.1 A lower bound example for 1-uniform matroids
Blumrosen and Holenstein [7] give an example where the gap between the revenue of the optimal SPM and that of
Myerson’s mechanism is a factor of
√
π/2 ≈ 1.253. We reproduce the example here for completeness. There are n
agents, each with a value distributed independently according to function F (v) = 1 − 1/v2. The seller has one item
to sell. Then, the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism is Γ(1/2)
√
n/2, where Γ() is the Gamma function. On
the other hand, the expected revenue of the optimal SPM can be computed to be
√
n/2. Therefore, we get a gap of
Γ(1/2)/
√
2 =
√
π/2 ≈ 1.253.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 6: an e
e−1
approximation for uniform and partition matroids
We first prove Theorem 6 for 1-uniform matroids. The RevenueRS of the SPM described in Section 4 can be written
as
RS =
n∑
i=1
cip
M
i q
M
i =
n∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qj)pMi qMi ,
where ci =
∏i−1
j=1(1 − qj) is the probability that agent i is offered service. Note that ci ≥ cj for i ≤ j. Let p be the
price satisfying the equation ∑
i
piqi = p
∑
i
qi. (2)
We now prove that among the set of all product distributions G = (G1 ×G2 × · · · ×Gn) which satisfy
• Pr[Myerson’s mechanism serves agent i] = qi; and
• ∑iG−1i (1− qi)qi =∑i piqi,
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the revenue obtained is lowest when G is the distribution for which all the prices are equal, i.e. G−1i (1 − qi) = p for
all agents i. Let RSeq denote the revenue of the SPM whose prices are equal to p for all agents.
Lemma 20 It is always the case that RS ≥ RSeq .
Proof: Let δi = qi(pi − p). So we have
RS =
n∑
i=1
cipiqi =
n∑
i=1
ci(pqi + δi) = RSeq +
n∑
i=1
ciδi ≥ RSeq ,
where the inequality follows from observing that:
• ci’s are in descending order;
• ∃j such that δi is non-negative for all i ≤ j and negative otherwise; and
• ∑i δi = 0 (By (2)) .
Theorem 21 The revenueRS of the SPM S is a ee−1 approximation to the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism
in the case of a 1-uniform matroid.
Proof: Let∑i qi = s (≤ 1). Lemma 20 implies the theorem when RSeq ≥ (1− 1e )ps. We can see this holds, since
RSeq = p(Pr[Some agent is served]) = p(1− Pr[No agent is served])
= p
(
1−
n∏
i=1
(1− qi)
)
≥ p
(
1−
n∏
i=1
(1− s/n)
)
(3)
≥ (1− 1/e)ps,
where (3) follows since the product is maximized when the qi’s are all equal.
Next we consider the k-uniform case.
Theorem 22 The revenueRS of the SPM S is a ee−1 approximation to the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism
in the case of a k-uniform matroid.
Proof: Our proof technique is closely related to the proof for 1-uniform matroids. If we define RSeq as defined above
for the 1-uniform case, then the proof of Lemma 20 extends to k-uniform matroids also. Thus it would be enough to
argue that RSeq achieves a e/(e− 1) approximation. Let p be the common price for all agents which satisfies (2).
For any set of probabilities {qi} in the k-item case, let us define qi′ = qi/k. Note that the probabilities {qi′} form
a valid set of probabilities for a 1-item case because∑
i
qi
′ =
∑
i
qi/k ≤ 1
Let c′i denote the probability that agent i is considered for service in the 1-item case. We can come up with distributions
Fi
′ for the 1-item case such that the price Fi′−1(1−qi′) is the same for all agents and is equal to p. By Theorem 21, we
know that the revenue in this 1-item case is at least (1 − 1/e)∑i pqi′. We prove that we get the same approximation
factor of e/(e − 1) for the k-item case by the following induction. We assume that for j − 1 ≤ n, the revenue Rj−1
from the first j − 1 items is at least k times the revenue R′j−1 from the first j − 1 items in the corresponding 1-item
case i.e.
∑j−1
i=1 cipqi ≥ k ·
∑j−1
i=1 c
′
ipqi
′
. We prove the same for j through two cases.
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1. If cj ≥ c′j , then we are done, because we know that revenue Rj from the first j items can be written as
Rj = Rj−1 + cjpqj ≥ k(R′j−1) + kc′jpqj ′ = kR′j .
The inequality uses the induction hypothesis.
2. If cj < c′j , we show that the revenue obtained is better than when cj = c′j and then we will be done. To see this
observe that the revenue Rj can be written as being conditioned on whether or not k items were sold in the first
j − 1 items. So we have
Rj = (1− cj)kp+ cj
(
pqj + E[ Revenue from first j − 1 | at most k − 1 of first j − 1 are served ]
)
;
since
kp ≥ (pqj + E[Revenue from first j − 1 | at most k − 1 of first j − 1 are served]),
the revenue only decreases by increasing cj to c′j .
Thus in either case, the k-item case has a better revenue, guaranteeing an approximation factor of ee−1 .
Corollary 23 The revenueRS of the SPM S is a ee−1 approximation to the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism
in the case of a partition-matroid.
We note that this analysis is tight. In particular, consider an example with n i. i. d. agents and a seller with one
item. Suppose that the value of each agent is independently 1 with probability 1 − ǫ and 0 otherwise for some small
ǫ > 0. Then, the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism is equal to the probability that at least one agent has value
1, which is 1 − o(1). The probability with which Myerson’s mechanism serves a particular agent is (1 − o(1))/n.
Therefore, our mechanism sets a price of 1 for each agent, and offers the price to each agent with probability roughly
1/n until some agent accepts. So the revenue of our mechanism is roughly 1− (1− 1/n)n = 1− 1/e. A similar gap
can be obtained even if the SPM decides to offer a price to the last agent with certainty when no other agent accepts
the item. Note that there is a simple SPM that in this case obtains the optimal revenue—offer a price of 1 to each agent
in turn with certainty until the item is sold.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 7: an m+ 1 approximation for intersections of m matroids
Let the m matroids be denoted byM1, M2, . . . , Mm. Let ranka(S) and spana(S) denote respectively the rank and
span of set S in the matroid Ma. Note that for any subset S and any a ∈ [m], we have
∑
i∈S q
M
i ≤ ranka(S).
Once again, let S = {i1 < i2 < · · · < iℓ} denote the set of agents served. We prove the theorem by showing that
the expected revenue of S is at least 1/(m+ 1)∑i piqi, by arguing that the total price paid by agents in S is at least
1/m times the expected revenue from agents that are “blocked” by S.
Let Sj denote the first j elements of S. For each 1≤a≤m, define sets Baj with respect to matroid Ma as in the
proof of Theorem 5. That is, Baj = spana(Sj) \ spana(Sj−1). Denote the price of item ij by pj . Then, if we let
Bj = ∪ma=1Baj , we can upper bound the expected revenue lost when S is served by
∑
1≤j≤ℓ
∑
i∈Bj
piqi ≤
m∑
a=1
∑
1≤j≤ℓ
∑
i∈Ba
j
piqi ≤ m
∑
1≤j<ℓ
pj.
Here we used the same algebraic transformation as in the proof of Theorem 5 along with the fact that
∑
i∈Ba
j
qi ≤∑
i∈spana(Sj)
qi ≤ j.
Therefore as before we get
∑
i piqi ≤ (m+ 1)Rσp.
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C.4 Proof of Theorem 8: an m + 1 approximation for combinatorial auctions with known
bundles of size m
Let A denote the set of items available to the seller, each with some multiplicity. First suppose that each agent is
single-minded, that is, each agent is interested in only one bundle of items, the bundle being of size at most m. Then,
the feasibility constraint is an intersection over |A| uniform matroids, one corresponding to each item, with each
agent participating in only m of the matroids. Now it is easy to adapt the proof of Theorem 7 to obtain an m + 1
approximation.
More generally suppose that every agent is interested in a collection of bundles, each of size at most m, and
modify the mechanism S so that in addition to deciding whether or not to serve an agent, it also arbitrarily allocates
any available desired bundle to every agent it serves. Then we can argue that for any set S, and set B blocked by the
agents in S, the sum of the probabilities qi over the set B is no more than m times the size of S. Therefore, once again
following along the proof of Theorem 7, we get an m+ 1 approximation.
C.5 Bad gap example for general non-matroids
We now show that the approximations described above cannot extend to general non-matroid set systems. In particular,
the example below describes a family of instances with i. i. d. agents and a symmetric non-matroid constraint for which
the ratio between the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism and that of the optimal SPM is Ω(log n/ log logn)
where n is the number of agents.
Example 1 For a givenm set n = mm+1. Partition [n] intomm groupsG1, · · · , Gmm of size m each, with Gi∩Gj =
∅ for all i 6= j. The set system J contains all subsets of groups Gi, that is, J = {A : ∃i with A ⊆ Gi}. Each agent
has a value of 1 with probability 1− 1/m and m with probability 1/m.
For any given valuation profile, let us call the agents with a value of m to be good agents and the rest to be bad
agents. The probability that a group contains m good agents is m−m. Therefore in expectation one group has m good
agents and Myerson’s mechanism can obtain revenue m2 from such a group: RM = Ω(m2).
Next consider any SPM. The mechanism can serve at most m agents. If all the served agents are bad, the mecha-
nism obtains a revenue of at most m. On the other hand, once the mechanism commits to serving a good agent, it can
only serve agents within the same group in the future. These have a total expected value less than 2m. Therefore, the
revenue of any SPM is at most 3m, and we get a gap of Ω(m) = Ω(logn/ log logn).
The above example also shows that while in many single-parameter pricing problems when the values are dis-
tributed in the range [1, h] it is possible to obtain a log h approximation to social welfare, the same does not hold in
our general setting. In the example we have h = m and the gap between the expected revenue of the optimal SPM
and that of Myerson’s mechanism is Ω(h). On the other hand, the gap is always bounded by O(h) and is achieved by
an SPM that charges each agent a uniform price of 1.
D Approximations via OPMs
D.1 General matroids.
In Section 5.1 we design an O(log k) approximate OPM for general matroids. We remark that a similar result was
obtained by Babaioff et al. [2] for the related matroid secretary problem. In Babaioff et al.’s setting agents arrive in a
random order but their values are adversarial. They present an O(log k) approximation by picking a price uniformly
at random in the set {h/k, 2h/k, · · · , h} and charging it to every agent; here h is the largest among all values. In our
setting such an approach does not work: the example below shows that no uniform pricing can achieve an o(log h)
approximation even for k = 1.
Example 2 Let k = 1 and consider a group of h agents where agent i has a value of i with probability 1/2i2 and zero
otherwise. Then an SPM that sets a price of i for agent i obtains an expected revenue of Ω(log h). On the other hand,
an SPM that uses a uniform price of c only obtains expected revenue∑i∈[c,h] c/2i2 < c/2c = 1/2.
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D.2 Uniform and partition matroids
Consider the following setting from [22]: a gambler is presented samples from n distributions in order, X1, . . . , Xn.
For each sample, the gambler must decide whether to pick this sample (and end the game) or skip it (to never return
to it). The gambler can choose at most one of the samples, and obtains a reward equal to the value of the sample. Can
the gambler do nearly as well in expectation as a prophet that knows the maximum value in the sample? Samuel-Cahn
[22] shows that there is a simple threshold rule for picking samples that uses a common threshold for each random
variable, such that the expected value of the gambler is within a factor of 2 of the expected value obtained by the
prophet. We first extend this result of [22] to the case where both gambler and prophet can pick k values, and then
describe how it applies to our setting of maximizing revenue.
We begin with some definitions. Given a collection of n independent, nonnegative random variables X1, . . . , Xn,
we consider extending the prophet inequalities to the case where the gambler and the prophet are each allowed k
choices. Let X(1) ≥ · · · ≥ X(n) be the order statistics for X1, . . . , Xn. For a value x, let (x)+ denote the positive
portion of x, i.e. (x)+ = max(0, x).
For a constant c, let t1(c), . . . , tk(c) denote the k indices selected by a threshold stopping rule using c, i.e. ti(c) is
the lesser (n− k+ i) and the ith smallest index j such that Xj≥c (or simply the former when the latter does not exist).
Let a∗ and b∗ be the unique solutions to the equations
a =
k∑
i=1
E
(
X(i) − a/k
)+
, and b =
n∑
i=1
E (Xi − b/k)+,
respectively. Then it must be the case that a∗ ≤ b∗, and we get the following theorem.
Theorem 24 For a∗ ≤ k · c ≤ b∗, we have that∑ki=1 E [X(i)] ≤ 2∑ki=1 E [Xti(c)].
Proof: First, we note that for any threshold t
k∑
i=1
E
[
X(i)
] ≤ k∑
i=1
E
[
t+
(
X(i) − t
)+]
= k · t+
k∑
i=1
E
(
X(i) − t
)+
,
which implies
∑k
i=1 E
[
X(i)
] ≤ 2a∗ with the substitution t = a∗/k. Now, any time tk(c) < n, we know there are at
least k Xi at or above our threshold c, and so
k∑
i=1
E
[
Xti(c)
] ≥ kc · Pr[tk < n] + k∑
i=1
E
(
Xti(c) − c
)+
.
Let I (E) denote the indicator random variable for event E . Considering the second term above, we see that
k∑
i=1
E
(
Xti(c) − c
)+
=
k∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
E
[
(Xj − c)+I (ti(c) = j)
]
=
n∑
j=1
E
[
(Xj − c)+I (tk(c) > j − 1)
]
≥
n∑
j=1
E (Xj − b∗/k)+ · Pr[tk(c) > n− 1].
Since the sum in the last line is precisely b∗, we see our choice of c gives
∑k
i=1 E
[
Xti(c)
] ≥ kc ≥ a∗ as claimed.
We now have the necessary results in place to proceed with the proof of Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 10. We prove our revenue bound via virtual values. We assume that all the Fi are regular. In fact,
we see that we choose prices which do not distinguish (for a given agent) between differing valuations that yield the
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same virtual value, and so by Proposition 18 may use ironed virtual values in the irregular case to achieve the same
result.
We cannot immediately apply Theorem 24, since virtual values can, in general, be negative; so we consider (φi)+
in place of φi. (Note that Myerson’s mechanism never selects an agent with a negative virtual value, and neither will
our mechanism.)
Let c be the threshold from applying Theorem 24 to the random variables (φi)+, and pi = inf{v : φi(v) ≥ c}.
Then, we can see that the expected revenue of an OPM using these prices is
Roblp = E
[
k∑
i=1
(
φti(c)
)+] ≥ 1
2
E
[
k∑
i=1
(
φ(i)
)+]
= RM/2.
An example with a gap of 2. We now show that OPMs cannot approximate the optimal revenue to within a factor
better than 2 even in the single-item setting. Consider a seller with one item and two agents. The first agent has a fixed
value of 1. The second has a value of 1/ǫ with probability ǫ and 0 otherwise, for some small constant ǫ > 0. Then,
the optimal mechanism can obtain a revenue of 2 − ǫ by first offering a price of 1/ǫ to the second agent, and then a
price of 1 to the first if the second declines the item. On the other hand, if the mechanism is forced to offer the item to
the first agent first, then it has two choices: (1) offer the item at price 1 to agent 1; the agent always accepts, and (2)
skip agent 1 and offer the item at price 1/ǫ to agent 2; the agent accepts with probability ǫ. In either case, the expected
revenue of the mechanism is 1.
D.3 Graphical matroids
Proof of Theorem 12. Our technique here is to partition the elements of the matroid such that we may treat each part
as a 1-uniform matroid yet still respect the original feasibility constraint, and achieve good revenue while doing so.
Let G = (V, [n]) be the graph defining our matroid constraint. Let δ(v) denote the set of edges incident on a vertex
v, and for each v ∈ V define qv =
∑
i∈δ(v) qi. Now, we can see that∑
v∈V
qv =
∑
i∈E
2qi ≤ 2(|V | − 1),
which can only hold if there exists v such that qv ≤ 2; let δ(v) be one of our partitions. Furthermore, the edge set δ(v)
forms a cut in G, and so given an independent set of edges from E−δ(v) we may add any single edge from δ(v) while
retaining independence. We apply this argument recursively to (V − v, E − δ(v)) to form the rest of our partition. At
the end, we have a partition of E such that each part has total mass no more than 2, and any collection of edges using
no more than one edge from each part is independent.
We now show that within each part P , we can achieve expected revenue at least a third of what Myerson’s mecha-
nism received from that part, via an application of Theorem 24. Note that the revenue achieved by offering an agent i
a price of pi is a random variable, and these random variables are nonnegative and independent. Furthermore, we can
successfully apply a threshold rule to them – we only offer to an agent if pi is above our threshold, and they accept if
and only if our stopping rule would have chosen this agent.
Let p =
∑
i∈P qi(pi − p)+. Then p is precisely the upper bound on acceptable thresholds for Theorem 24 applied
to our specified random variables, allowing one choice. From the proof of that theorem, we can see that applying the
threshold p results in an expected revenue of at least p; on the other hand,∑
i∈P
piqi ≤
∑
i∈P
qi(p+ (pi − p)+) = p(1 +
∑
i∈P
qi) ≤ 3p.
D.4 Matroid intersections
Proof of Theorem 13. We describe the mechanism which achieves a 6.75-approximation when the distributions are
regular. Appendix E sketches the extension to the non-regular case.
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Let qi = qMi /3 and pi = Fi
−1(1 − qi). Note that pi ≥ pMi . The mechanism serves agents in any arbitrary order,
but offers a price of pi for agent i.
Let ci denote the probability that agent i is considered for service. We prove that ci ≥ 4/9 for all i. This would
prove the theorem, as the expected revenue is
Roblp =
∑
i
cipiqi ≥
∑
i
(4/9)pMi (q
M
i /3) ≥
∑
i
(1/6.75)pMi q
M
i .
LetM1, M2 be the two partition matroids. Let agent i be in partition P1 ofM1 and in partition P2 ofM2. Let k1 be
the maximum number of elements in P1 that can be present in an independent set of M1 and let k2 be the maximum
number of elements in P2 that can be present in an independent set of M2. We then have that for j = 1, 2 that the
expected number of agents in Pj desiring service is∑
i∈Pj
qi ≤ kj/3.
Define Ej to be the event that at most kj − 1 agents from Pj desire service for j = 1, 2; then agent i is always
considered for service when events E1 and E2 both happen. By Markov’s inequality, it is clear that Pr[E¯1] ≤ 1/3 and
Pr[E¯2] ≤ 1/3. So we may conclude that
ci ≥ Pr[E1 ∩ E2] = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2|E1] ≥ (2/3) · (2/3),
and the claim follows.
D.5 Order-oblivious pricings in the non-matroid setting
In this section we present an example with a non-matroid constraint for which the revenue obtained by ordering the
agents in the optimal way is a factor of Ω(logn/ log logn) larger than that obtained by ordering the agents in the least
optimal way.
Lemma 25 There exists an instance of the single-parameter mechanism design problem with a non-matroid feasibility
constraint, along with two orderings σ1 and σ2 such that the revenue of the optimal SPM using ordering σ1 is a factor
of Ω(log n/ log logn) larger than that of the optimal SPM using ordering σ2.
Proof: Consider the following example. Construct a complete m-ary tree of height m+ 1, and place a single agent at
each node other than the root. The agents’ valuations are i. i. d. , where any agent has a valuation of m with probability
1/m, and a valuation of 0 otherwise. Our constraint on serving the agents is that we may serve any set of agents that
lie along a single path from the root of the tree to some leaf – it is easy to verify that this is downward-closed.
Consider what happens when we may serve the agents in order by level from the root of the tree to the leaves. At
each level of the tree, we may offer to serve at least m different agents, regardless of the outcome on previous levels.
Since we may never sell to more than one agent per level, our revenue is either 0 or m on each level. We get a revenue
of 0 if and only if every agent has a valuation of 0; this occurs with probability at most
(1− 1/m)m ≤ 1/e,
and thus our expected revenue overall is at least
m2 · (1− 1/e) = Ω(m2).
On the other hand, if we must serve the agents in order by level from the leaves of the tree to the root, then the first
agent we serve commits us to a specific path. So we cannot hope to achieve revenue better than m for this specific
node, plus the revenue expected revenue for an arbitrarily chosen path. Since each agent has an expected valuation of
1, this is bounded by
m+ (m− 1) · 1 = O(m).
Thus, the difference in revenue between the described orderings is Ω(m); since the total number of agents is
n = O(mm), in terms of n this gap is Ω(log n/ log logn).
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E Approximation in the non-regular case
We now sketch changes required to the theorems proved in Sections 4 and 5 to obtain the same approximations in the
non-regular case.
From Lemma 2 we know that for every i, there exist prices pi and pi with corresponding probabilities qi =
1 − Fi(pi) and qi = 1 − Fi(pi), as well as a number xi such that xiqi + (1 − xi)qi = qMi , and Myerson’s expected
revenue is bounded by
∑
i(xipiqi + (1 − xi)piqi). In fact this holds more generally. Let qi be any probability less
than 1. Then there exist probabilities qi and qi, and a number xi ∈ [0, 1] with qi = xiqi + (1 − xi)qi, such that for
pi = Fi
−1(1 − qi), pi = Fi−1(1 − qi), and pi defined as
xipiqi + (1 − xi)piqi
qi
,
the optimal revenue achievable by selling an item with probability qi to agent i is no more than piqi.
Now consider a hypothetical situation in which the probability that agent i accepts a price of pi is exactly qi, and
consider running an SPM/OPM with prices pi that is α-approximate with respect to
∑
i piqi. We claim that we obtain
an α-approximation by using the same SPM/OPM but instead picking a price of pi with probability xi and pi with
probability 1− xi.
To prove the claim we first note that we can defer the process of picking a price for agent i until the mechanism
decides to offer the agent some price. In this case, the probability that the agent accepts the offered price is exactly
qi, and the revenue obtained from the agent conditioned on serving him is exactly pi. Therefore, the probability
that the mechanism makes an offer to an agent is also identical to the corresponding probability in the hypothetical
deterministic mechanism, and the expected revenue of the mechanism is exactly the same as that of the hypothetical
mechanism.
F Computing the near-optimal posted-price mechanisms
We now describe how to compute the approximately optimal OPMs and SPMs designed in Sections 4 and 5. We
assume that we are given access to the following oracles and algorithms:
• An algorithm to compute the optimal price to charge to a single-parameter agent given the agent’s value distri-
bution. Note that given such an algorithm and some value x, we can modify it to return the optimal price in the
range [x,∞) to charge the agent.
• An oracle that given a value v and index i returns Fi(v) and fi(v), as well as, given a probability α returns
Fi
−1(α). Note that the oracle can be used to compute the virtual value φi(v).
• An oracle for computing ironed virtual values in order to compute the approximately optimal SPM for non-
regular distributions.
• An algorithm to maximize social welfare over the given feasibility constraint in order to be able to compute the
outcome of Myerson’s mechanism.
All of the mechanisms designed by us require computing the probabilities qMi . We first show how to estimate these
probabilities within small constant factors:
1. Let ǫ = 1/3n. Sample N = 4n4 logn/ǫ2 value profiles from F1 × F2 × · · · × Fn. For each sample, compute
the (ironed) virtual value for each agent, and use these to compute the outcome of Myerson’s mechanism for
that value profile.
2. Estimate the probabilities qMi using the samples. Call the estimates q̂Mi .
3. If q̂Mi < 1/n2, set q̂i = 1/n2, else set q̂i = q̂Mi /(1− ǫ). Compute for each i the value p̂i = Fi−1(1− q̂i).
4. Find the optimal price in the range [p̂i,∞) to charge to agent i. Call it pi. Let qi = 1− Fi(pi).
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5. Output the prices computed in the last step and order the agents in order of decreasing prices.
In order to analyse the performance of this approach, we compare it to a mechanism that charges agent i the price
pMi = Fi
−1(1 − qMi ) but uses the same ordering as the mechanism above. We first show that the probabilities qi
closely estimate the probabilities qMi .
Lemma 26 With probability at least 1− 2/n, we have q̂i ∈ [qMi , (1 + 3ǫ)qMi + 2/n2].
Proof: First, for any i with qMi ≥ 1/n4, using Chernoff bounds we get that
Pr
[∣∣q̂Mi − qMi ∣∣ ≥ ǫqMi ] ≤ 2e−ǫ2qMi N/2 ≤ 2/n2
q̂Mi ∈ (1 ± ǫ)qMi in turn implies by definition that qMi ≤ q̂i ≤ (1 + ǫ)/(1 − ǫ)qMi ≤ (1 + 3ǫ)qMi . Therefore we
have q̂i ∈ [qMi , (1 + 3ǫ)qMi ]. On the other hand, for qMi < 1/n4, by Markov’s inequality, with probability 1 − 1/n2,
q̂Mi < 1/n
2
, and so q̂i ∈ [qMi , 1/n2]. The lemma now follows by employing the union bound.
Furthermore, conditioned on the event defined in the statement of the above lemma (call it E), since pMi lies in
the range [p̂i,∞), we have that qMi pMi ≤ qipi. This implies that the prices pi give a good estimate on the revenue of
Myerson’s mechanism.
Next, we compare the real mechanism S with prices pi to the theoretically good mechanism S ′ that charges prices
pMi . Let S be the set of agents for which q̂Mi < 1/n2. The probability that any of these agents is offered service
in S is at most 1/n. Conditioned on this event not happening, the probability that an agent is made an offer in S is
no smaller than its counterpart in S ′. Moreover, conditioned on being made an offer, the revenue from an agent i is
qipi ≥ qMi pMi .
Therefore, conditioned on the event E , the expected revenue of S is at least a (1 − 1/n) fraction of the expected
revenue of S ′. But the event E happens with probability 1− 2/n, therefore, we get a (1− o(1)) approximation to the
expected revenue of S ′.
G Approximations for the BMUMD
We first prove that there exists a good OPM for instances of the BMUMD involving a feasibility constraint that is the
intersection of a graphical matroid and the agents’ unit-demand constraints.
Proof of Theorem 15. Note that though the feasibility constraint we are facing is the intersection of a graphical matroid
and partition matroid (from the unit demand constraint), we can view the situation as if we were in the intersection
of two partition matroids. This follows from the proof of Theorem 12, where we see that a graphical matroid can be
seen as a union of 1-uniform matroids, which is a partition matroid. The total probability mass of the elements of
each 1-uniform matroid is at most 2. Thus, if we sell at prices for which the probability of an agent i desiring the
item is qMi /4, then with a probability of at least 1/2 no more than 1 agent will desire service in the 1-uniform matroid
which contains i and with a probability of at least 3/4 no more than 1 item is desired by the agent i. Thus the revenue
obtained gives an approximation factor of 4 · 4/3 · 2 = 32/3 ≈ 10.67.
Next we prove that for the two settings discussed in Section 6.2, we can design an SPM that achieves a good approxi-
mation via implementation in undominated strategies.
Formally, for an agent i, a strategy si is said to be dominated by a strategy s′i if for all strategies s−i of other
agents, the utility that i obtains from using si is no better than that from using s′i, and for some strategy s−i, it is
strictly worse. A mechanism is an algorithmic implementation of an α-approximation in undominated strategies [4] if
for every outcome of the mechanism where every agent plays an undominated strategy, the objective function value of
the mechanism is within a factor of α of the optimal, and every agent can easily compute for any dominated strategy
a strategy that dominates it.
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Proof of Lemma 16. Note that if agent i desires only one service j ∈ Ji, and refuses the service when offered, the agent
obtains a utility of 0 regardless of others’ strategies. On the other hand, the strategy of accepting the service when
offered has strictly positive utility for some strategy profiles of others, therefore it dominates the previous strategy.
Proof of Theorem 17. We consider the matroid intersection setting first and assume that the valuation distributions
are regular. The non-regular case is similar. Our SPM in this setting considers the hypothetical single-dimensional
instance Icopies defined in Section 3 and computes the probabilities qMj with which Myerson’s mechanism allocates
the service j. We then set qj = qMj /2 and pi = Fj
−1(1 − qj). Note that for any i,
∑
j∈Ji
qj ≤ 1/2. Therefore, with
probability at least 1/2, i desires no service other than j (we say that j is uniquely desired by i). Lemma 16 shows
that in this case, in any undominated strategy implementation, if i is offered j and desires it, then i accepts j.
For any particular run of the mechanism, divide the set of all services into three groups—S, the set of sold services,
B the set of services that are desired by their corresponding agents but “blocked” by services in S, and U the set of
services that are desired by their corresponding agents and not in sets S or B. Then Lemma 16 implies that services
in U are not uniquely desired. Now, the expected total price in the union of the sets S, B and U is exactly
∑
j pjqj .
Moreover, the expected total price in U is at most 1/2
∑
j pjqj . Finally, following the proof of Theorem 5, the
expected total price in B conditioned on S is at most the total price contained in S. Therefore, putting everything
together we get that the expected total price obtained from S is at least 1/4
∑
j pjqj . By our choice of p and q, this is
an 8-approximation.
The argument for the combinatorial auction setting is identical and based on Theorem 8. We omit it for brevity.
H Approximating social welfare and other objectives via posted-price mech-
anisms
We now show that our approach from Sections 4 and 5 in fact extends to the problem of maximizing any objective that
is linear in social value and revenue via SPMs.
We start with some definitions. For all i ∈ [n] let gi(v, p) = αiv + βip denote an arbitrary linear function of
v and p. For a mechanism A with payment rule p, let G(A,p) be the expected value of g over the outcome of the
mechanism, that is, G(A,p) = Ev[
∑
i∈A(v) g
i(vi, pi)]. Define the virtual value of i with respect to gi to be
φGi (v) = (αi + βi)v − βi
1− Fi(v)
fi(v)
and the virtual surplus with respect to G of a set S of agents to be ΦG(S) =
∑
i∈S φ
G
i (vi). Then, the lemma below
follows from standard techniques, and allows us to ignore the payment function in trying to maximize G.
Lemma 27 For any truthful mechanismA with payment rule p, the expected virtual surplus with respect to G of A is
equal to the expected value of G for A’s outcome. That is,
G(A,p) = E
v
[ΦG(A(v))]
The lemma suggests that a mechanism MG with allocation rule MG(v) = argmaxS ΦG(S) maximizes G over the
class of all truthful mechanisms. However, as for revenue-maximizing mechanisms, in order for this mechanism to be
truthful, the distributions Fi must satisfy a certain regularity condition.
Definition 4 A one dimensional distribution distribution F is regular with respect to functionG, if φG(v) is monotone
non-decreasing in v.
The following theorem is straightforward:
Theorem 28 If for all i, Fi is regular with respect to G, the mechanismMG defined above is truthful and obtains the
maximum value of G over the class of all truthful mechanisms.
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In order to optimize G over the class of SPMs in the matroid setting, we follow an approach similar to the one in
Section 4. Other approximations are similar. We focus on the regular setting. Our approximately optimal mechanism
is defined as follows. Let MG denote the optimal mechanism in Theorem 28 above. Let qGi denote the probability
that MG serves agent i. Define for all i
qi = q
G
i ,
pi = Fi
−1(1− qi), and,
γi =
(∫ ∞
pi
φGi (vi)fi(vi)dvi
)
/qi
The SPM sets a price of pi for agent i and offers to serve the agents in decreasing order of their corresponding γi’s.
The γi reflects the expected virtual value we get from agent i upon serving the agent. We denote this mechanism by
SG.
We first note that the performance of SG can be bounded in terms of the γi’s. In particular, Lemma 27 and the
definition of γi imply that
G(SG) = E
v
[∑
i∈S
γi
]
where S is the set of agents that are allocated service. Following the argument for Theorem 5 we infer that since agents
are ordered in decreasing order of γi, Ev
[∑
i∈S γi
] ≥ 12 ∑i qiγi. In order to complete our argument, we bound the
performance of MG in terms of the γi’s.
Lemma 29 If for all i, Fi is regular with respect to G, then G(MG) ≤
∑
i γiqi.
Proof: Let us consider the contribution of agent i to the objective function value for MG. This is no more than the
objective function value achieved by an optimal mechanism that sells only to i and with probability at most qi. By
the definition of ΦG and using regularity, this is exactly
∫∞
pi
φGi (vi)fi(vi)dvi where pi = Fi
−1(1 − qi). Finally, the
integral is exactly equal to γiqi by the definition of γi.
We therefore have the following theorem:
Theorem 30 The mechanism SG defined above obtains a 2-approximation to the objective G in the matroid case
when all the input distributions are regular with respect to G.
Similar techniques prove analogues of other theorems in Sections 4 and 5 for arbitrary functions G. Finally, we
note that if the distributions are not regular as defined in Definition 4, we can apply an ironing procedure to the virtual
values in much the same way as in Myerson’s approach. We leave the details to the reader.
I Revenue maximization through VCG mechanisms
A consequence of our constant-factor approximation to revenue through SPMs is that in matroid settings VCG mech-
anisms with appropriate reserve prices are near-optimal in terms of revenue. This follows from noting, as we show
below, that VCG mechanisms perform no worse in terms of expected revenue than SPMs with the same reserve prices.
Although VCG mechanisms aim to maximize the social welfare of the outcome, setting high enough reserve prices
allows them to also obtain good revenue.
Formally, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism Vp with reserve prices p serves the set S of agents, with
vi ≥ pi for all i ∈ S, that maximizes
∑
i∈S vi.
Hartline and Roughgarden [13] show that in several single-parameter settings the VCG mechanism with monopoly
reserve prices gives a constant factor approximation to revenue. This result holds when all the value distributions
satisfy the so-called monotone hazard rate condition, or with a matroid feasibility constraint when all the value distri-
butions are regular. Their result does not extend to the case of matroids with general (non-regular) value distributions.
One of the main questions left open by their work is whether there is some set of reserve prices (not necessarily equal
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to the monopoly reserve prices) for which the VCG mechanism gives a constant factor approximation to revenue in
the matroid setting with general value distributions. We answer this question in the positive. We use the following fact
about matroids.
Proposition 31 Let B1 and B2 be any two independent sets of equal size in a matroid set system J . Then there is a
bijective function g : B1 \B2 → B2 \B1 such that for all e ∈ B1 \B2, B1 \ {e} ∪ {g(e)} is independent in J .
Theorem 32 For any instance of the single-parameter Bayesian mechanism design problem with a matroid feasibility
constraint, there exists a set of reserve prices such that the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism with those reserve
prices is at least half of the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism.
Proof: We prove that when the set system J is a matroid, for any collection of prices p, the revenue of the SPM Sp is
no more than the revenue of the VCG mechanism Vp. The result then follows from Theorem 5.
Fix a value vector v and let A denote the set served by Sp and B denote the set served by Vp. Then, since both
mechanisms serve a maximal independent set among the set of agents with vi ≥ pi, we have |A| = |B|. Proposition 31
then implies the existence of a bijection g such that for all e ∈ B \ A, B \ {e} ∪ {g(e)} is independent. This implies
that Vp charges e a price of at least the value of g(e), which is at least the reserve price pg(e). On the other hand,
by definition, the price charged to any e ∈ B ∩ A is at least pe. Therefore, the revenue of Vp in this case is at least∑
e∈B∩A pe +
∑
e∈B\A pg(e) =
∑
e∈A pe which is equal to the revenue of Sp.
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